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Executive Summary
LONE-ACTOR TERRORISTS ARE perceived as presenting acute challenges for law-enforcement practitioners in detection and disruption. By definition, they act without direct command and control from a wider network, and it is assumed that without such 
communications they may evade the ‘tripwires’ that would usually bring them to the attention 
of the authorities. The Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project aims to investigate this 
assumption. Through the construction and analysis of a database of 120 lone actors from across 
Europe, it seeks to improve understanding of lone-actor terrorists, their behaviour and their 
activities in the period leading up to intended attacks.
Methodology
Defining ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism’
Although the term ‘lone-actor terrorism’ is often used, there remains significant disagreement 
regarding its interpretation. Rather than seeking to settle ongoing debates on these issues, a 
working definition was established for the purposes of this project:1
The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely personal-
material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct support 
in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by 
any group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others).
This working definition was broken down into specific inclusion criteria. In order to be included 
in the database there must be evidence to indicate that each of these criteria has been met. 
Absence of evidence to the contrary is insufficient. While this may mean that some cases of 
lone-actor terrorism are omitted, this approach reduces the possibility of contamination by 
cases that fall outside the definition and therefore increases the validity of subsequent analysis.
Data Collection and Coding
The CLAT database captures instances of lone-actor terrorism – both plots and attacks – across 
thirty European countries (EU member states, in addition to Norway and Switzerland) between 
1 January 2000 and 31 December 2014. In the first instance, the Global Terrorism Database 
was used to find possible cases;2 these were then investigated through news reporting to 
1. For further discussion regarding this definition and how it was established, see Edwin Bakker and 
Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Definitional Workshop’, RUSI Occasional 
Paper (December 2015).
2. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), ‘Global 
Terrorism Database’, 2015, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>, accessed 22 February 2016.
iv Lone-Actor Terrorism
determine whether they met the project criteria for inclusion. This was followed by additional 
internet searches, in English and local languages, using broad search terms to identify any 
further examples. Finally, country experts were contacted to verify that relevant cases had been 
identified, thereby ensuring the database was as comprehensive as possible.
Guided by the CLAT literature review,3 the researchers identified subject areas and issues to be 
investigated by the project; variables were then created to capture the information required, 
with coding guidance detailed in a project codebook to ensure consistency across the research 
teams. Double-coding exercises were also conducted, with different teams coding the same 
cases to highlight and eliminate any difference in practice.
To record the ideology of lone-actor terrorists, the project adopted the categories used by 
Europol in its ‘Situation and Trend’ reports.4 In cases where the perpetrator appeared to have 
taken inspiration from multiple ideologies, the case was coded as ‘other’.
Limitations
Despite extensive effort by the research team, the CLAT database does not contain every lone-
actor terrorism plot during the period studied. First, not all plots are in the public domain, 
especially where they have been abandoned or disrupted by the authorities at an early stage. 
Second, there are variations across Europe in the way incidents are perceived and reported; for 
example, some incidents may be reported as a ‘hate crime’, but meet the criteria for inclusion 
in the CLAT database. The research team took steps to compensate; however, some cases will 
undoubtedly have been missed.
There are also some important limitations to the data due to the use of open-source reporting. 
First, complete information is not always available, leading to a number of variables featuring 
high levels of ‘unknown’ entries. For some variables, this unavoidably limited the analysis 
that could be conducted and the strength of the conclusions that could be drawn. Second, 
there is an inevitable element of reporting bias: whether information is publicly available may 
depend on whether it was interesting to the journalists investigating the story. Finally, the 
research teams faced particular challenges in finding open-source information in relation to 
mental-health issues.
Analysis
Four thematic areas were identified for analysis: attack methodology and logistics; political 
engagement and online activity; personal characteristics; leakage and interactions with 
authorities. Due to the limitations of the data, the consortium agreed that the data-
set did not support detailed and sophisticated quantitative analysis. Instead, more 
3. Raffaello Pantucci, Clare Ellis and Lorien Chaplais, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review’, RUSI 
Occasional Paper (December 2015).
4. See Europol, European Union Terrorism and Situation Trend Report 2015 (The Hague: Europol, 
2015).
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limited quantitative analysis was used to explore the data and highlight key trends; these 
were subsequently explored in greater detail through examination of case information. 
Key Findings 
Process Variables: Attack Methodology and Logistics
• Of the seventy-two successfully launched attacks recorded in the database, religiously 
inspired attacks were the most frequent at 38 per cent, but caused only 8 per cent of 
fatalities; right-wing terrorist attacks were more lethal, accounting for 24 per cent of 
launched attacks but 48 per cent of fatalities
• The most frequent targets were civilians, in particular ethnic and religious minorities, 
asylum seekers and immigrants. A large majority of religious targets were Muslim
• Explosives resulted in only 4 per cent of fatalities, contrasting sharply with firearms 
which accounted for 89 per cent 
• Lone-actor terrorists with military training or experience were, on average, more lethal 
than their  untrained counterparts, accounting for 19 per cent of perpetrators but 29 per 
cent of fatalities. 
Process Variables: Political Engagement and Online Activity
• Religiously inspired and right-wing perpetrators account for three out of four lone-actor 
terrorists in Europe over the past fifteen years (religiously inspired 38 per cent; right 
wing 33 per cent) 
• The majority of lone-actor terrorists communicate their motivations orally or through 
internet postings; very few write detailed manifestos (only 13 per cent)
• The majority of lone-actor terrorists (58 per cent) did not exhibit signs of political 
engagement. However, of those that did, right-wing lone actors were more likely to be 
active in political movements than those motivated by religion
• Approximately two-thirds of lone actors had never been active within an extremist group; 
however, where links were found, 65 per cent were with groups known to advocate or 
at least condone violence
• For lone actors who were active online, mainstream social media was the most popular 
medium for communication. More broadly, the Internet was used for downloading 
training material and conducting basic reconnaissance.
Personal Variables: Personal Characteristics
• Religiously inspired and right-wing ideologies present very different age profiles: the 
majority of religiously inspired perpetrators were younger than twenty-five years old, 
with the number of perpetrators declining as age increased; this is in direct contrast to 
right-wing lone-actor terrorists where the majority were at least forty years old 
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• The findings indicate a possible link between social isolation and mental-health disorders; 
this was particularly pronounced in the case of school shooters 
• Religiously-inspired perpetrators were seldom socially isolated 
• Where legally owned firearms were the weapon chosen for attack, there was an 
indication of mental-health disorder in 53 per cent of perpetrators. 
Process Variables: Leakage and Interactions with Authorities
• Of lone-actor terrorists recorded in the database, 34 per cent exhibited a change in 
behaviour. These changes were more prevalent within the religiously inspired category 
where 50 per cent of perpetrators exhibited this potential indicator, in contrast to only 
15 per cent of right-wing terrorist plotters
• Of perpetrators, 46 per cent exhibited ‘leakage’ – giving an indication of either their 
extreme views, intention to act or even some attack details in advance
• Of the religiously inspired perpetrators that exhibited leakage, 45 per cent ‘leaked’ to 
friends or family, in contrast to only 18 per cent of leakage by right-wing perpetrators. 
Right-wing lone-actor terrorists were more likely to post telling indicators online, where 
41 per cent of their leakage occurred
• Excluding cases where a perpetrator was identified during (or immediately following) an 
incident, 40 per cent of right-wing extremists were uncovered by an element of chance 
– for example, as part of an investigation into other offences or because the perpetrator 
accidentally detonated a device.
Conclusion
Analysis of the CLAT database reaffirms a key assertion from the literature review: there is no 
consistent profile for a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across 
Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most 
likely to manifest, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the period leading up to the 
attack. The policy implications of these findings will be explored in detail within dedicated 
papers in the CLAT series:
1. ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper One: Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists’
2. ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper Two: Attack Methodology and Logistics’
3. ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper Three: Motivations, Political Engagement and 
Online Activity’
4. ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper Four: “Leakage” and Interaction with Authorities’.
LONE-ACTOR TERRORISTS ARE perceived as presenting acute challenges for law-enforcement practitioners in detection and disruption. By definition, they act without direct command and control from a wider network, and it is assumed that without such 
communications they may evade the ‘tripwires’ that would usually bring them to the attention 
of the authorities. The Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project aims to investigate this 
assumption. Through the construction and analysis of a database of 120 lone-actor cases from 
across Europe, it seeks to improve understanding of lone-actor terrorists, their behaviour and 
their activities in the period leading up to intended attacks. 
This paper presents the key findings from analysis of the CLAT database. Given the extensive 
nature of the enquiries conducted, the results from every test are not recorded here; instead 
this paper offers a comprehensive outline of the most interesting – and policy-relevant – 
findings. It is structured as follows: the first section outlines the methodologies used in data 
collection, coding and analysis, in addition to discussing the limitations of the research. Sections 
two to five present findings from the analysis within the following themes: attack methodology 
and logistics; political engagement and online activity; personal characteristics; leakage and 
interactions with authorities. The final section outlines the next steps in taking these findings 
and producing recommendations for policy-makers and practitioners.
Methodology
Defining ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism’
Although the term ‘lone-actor terrorist’ is often used, there remains significant disagreement 
regarding its interpretation. Principal areas of divergence relate to the level of isolation, for 
example: can a dyad (a group of two people) or triad (three people) be included if they act 
without direction from a wider network; can a lone actor be inspired by the ideology of a 
terrorist group; and what degree of engagement with a broader network is acceptable? 
Rather than seeking to settle ongoing debates about such issues, a working definition of lone-
actor terrorism was established for the purposes of this project:1
The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely 
personal-material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without 
any direct support in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to 
act is not directed by any group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others).
1. For further discussion regarding this definition and how it was established, see Edwin Bakker and 
Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Definitional Workshop’, RUSI Occasional 
Paper (December 2015).
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By design, the definition is broad so that as many potential cases as possible are captured 
in the database. This enables the CLAT project – and users of the database – to potentially 
refine the definition of lone-actor terrorism through case analysis, discarding categories (where 
appropriate) in an evidence-based manner. 
The working definition was subsequently broken down into the following inclusion criteria:
1. Violence, or the threat of violence, must be planned or carried out
2. The perpetrator(s) must be an individual, dyad or triad
3. The perpetrator must act without any direct support in the planning, preparation and 
execution of the attack
4. The perpetrator’s decision to act must not be directed by any group or other individuals
5. The motivation cannot be purely personal-material gain
6. The target of the attack extends beyond those victims who are immediately 
impacted by the act.
In order to be included in the database there must be evidence to indicate that each of these 
criteria has been met. Absence of evidence to the contrary is insufficient. For example, if the 
number of perpetrators is unknown or in doubt, then the case has not been included within 
the data-set. While this may mean that some cases of lone-actor terrorism are omitted, this 
approach reduces the possibility of contamination by cases that fall outside the definition and 
therefore increases the validity of subsequent analysis.
Data Collection and Coding
The CLAT database captures instances of lone-actor terrorism – both plots and attacks – across 
thirty European countries (EU member states, in addition to Norway and Switzerland) between 
1 January 2000 and 31 December 2014. Partners in the CLAT project were divided into research 
teams, each responsible for gathering data from an open source in relation to specific countries 
within the study area. In the first instance, the Global Terrorism Database was used to find 
possible cases;2 these were then investigated through news reporting to determine whether 
they met the project criteria for inclusion. This was followed by additional internet searches, in 
English and local languages, using broad search terms to identify any further examples. Finally, 
country experts were contacted to verify that relevant cases had been identified, thereby 
ensuring the database was as comprehensive as possible.
Guided by the CLAT literature review,3 the researchers identified subject areas and issues to be 
investigated by the project; variables were then chosen to capture the information required, 
with coding guidance detailed in a project codebook to ensure consistency across the research 
teams. Double-coding exercises were also conducted: sample cases that had been coded by 
2. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), ‘Global 
Terrorism Database’, 2015, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>, accessed 22 February 2016.
3. Raffaello Pantucci, Clare Ellis and Lorien Chaplais, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review’, RUSI 
Occasional Paper (December 2015).
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one team were presented to another and the coding results compared; where any differences 
were identified, the teams discussed those variables, determined the correct coding option and 
further clarification was added to the codebook where necessary.
Some variables were designed to record biographical information such as age or gender, 
some the methodology and impact of the plot, while others sought to capture the activities 
of the perpetrator in the period leading up to the attack. To record the ideology of lone-actor 
terrorists, the project adopted the categories used by Europol in its ‘Situation and Trend’ reports: 
‘religiously inspired’; ‘ethno-nationalist and separatist’; ‘left-wing and anarchist’; ‘right-wing’; 
‘single issue’; ‘other’; and ‘unknown’.4 The use of Europol’s categories is intended to facilitate 
the use of CLAT data alongside other studies of terrorism within Europe.
In cases where the perpetrator appeared to have taken inspiration from multiple ideologies, 
their case was coded as ‘other’. This category also includes the perpetrators of school shootings, 
particularly significant across Scandinavian countries since 2007. This cohort is often omitted 
from studies of lone-actor terrorism; however, in many cases they present the same identification 
challenges from a practitioner perspective. Following consultation with national experts, some 
‘school shooters’ were therefore included on the basis of their compatibility with the CLAT 
project definition: that is, those who were motivated by an ideology and the desire to convey a 
political message to a wider audience. 
Limitations
Despite extensive effort by the research team, the CLAT database does not contain every lone-
actor terrorism plot during the period studied. First, not all plots are in the public domain, 
especially where they were abandoned or disrupted by the authorities at an early stage. Second, 
there are variations across Europe in the way incidents are perceived and reported; for example, 
some incidents may be reported as a ‘hate crime’, but meet the criteria for inclusion in the 
CLAT database. 
This under-reporting was particularly evident when collecting data on attacks or plots in Eastern 
Europe. For example, in Hungary there are known to be incidents of xenophobic violence;5 
however, the task of collecting detailed media reportage of attacks proved very difficult. In 
many cases, the research teams found limited media coverage of potential right-wing extremism 
plots and attacks, with far greater public attention focused on religiously inspired incidents. The 
research team took steps to compensate, searching in local languages and using broad search 
terms to identify possible cases and then examine them against the project criteria (for instance, 
also searching for hate crimes); however, some cases will undoubtedly have been missed. 
4. See Europol, European Union Terrorism and Situation Trend Report 2015 (The Hague: Europol, 
2015)
5. European Roma Rights Centre, ‘Attacks against Roma in Hungary: January 2008–September 2012’, 
October 2012, <http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/attacks-list-in-hungary.pdf>, accessed 22 
February 2016. 
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There are also some important limitations to the data due to the use of open-source reporting. 
First, complete information is not always available, leading to a number of variables featuring 
high levels of ‘unknown’ entries. This creates challenges in analysis as it cannot be determined 
whether the ‘unknown’ entries would have the same ratio of distribution between the different 
options as the complete entries. Therefore, although the database contains 120 cases, analysis 
of specific variables was sometimes conducted using a subset of the data where complete 
information was available; in this scenario, and in particular when comparing subgroups within 
the data-set, the sample used is more limited than the overall number of cases suggests. For 
some variables, this unavoidably limited the analysis that could be conducted and the strength 
of the conclusions that could be drawn.
Second, there is an inevitable element of reporting bias: whether information is publicly 
available may depend on whether it was interesting to the journalists investigating the story. 
For example, whether a terrorist exhibited mental-health problems is perhaps more often a 
question raised in relation to lone actors than cases involving larger terrorist cells.6 
It is conceivable that for certain variables of particular interest to journalists, such as mental-
health issues, illicit drug use or indications of previous violence, where there is evidence it 
is likely to be reported. However, where variables are not mentioned in reporting, it is not 
clear whether it is because they are not applicable to the case or simply that they were not 
covered: absence of evidence does not equate to evidence of absence. Some variables were 
therefore designed to record whether there was an ‘indication’ that it applied to the case, and 
the research team focused on cases where there was positive evidence, rather than trying to 
interpret the significance of missing information. 
Finally, the research teams faced particular challenges in finding open-source information in 
relation to mental-health issues. Many perpetrators may not have received a clinical diagnosis, 
but personal information included in news reports acts as a proxy indicator, clearly suggesting a 
relevant condition. Given the potential significance of this issue, as highlighted in the literature 
review, there was a reluctance to exclude it from the CLAT analysis. Separate variables were 
therefore created: first, capturing whether there were any proxy indicators of mental-health 
problems in case reporting, enabling the team to make use of the information available; and 
second, detailing clinical diagnoses where they had been conducted, to record and clearly 
distinguish medical opinion where it was available. 
6. See, for example, Toby Archer, ‘Breivik’s Mindset: The Counterjihad and the New Transatlantic 
Anti-Muslim Right’, in Max Taylor, P M Currie and Donald Holbrook (eds), Extreme Right Wing 
Political Violence and Terrorism (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 169–86. In discussing the scrutiny 
applied to the mental state of Breivik, the author highlights that questions are rarely raised 
regarding the mental health of ‘the Palestinian or Iraqi suicide bomber, of Jihadi terrorists around 
the world, or of ethno-nationalists radicals be they Basque, Corsican or Tamil’. See p. 170.
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Analysis
Four thematic areas were identified for analysis: attack methodology and logistics; political 
engagement and online activity; personal characteristics; leakage and interactions with 
authorities. Due to the limitations of the data, the consortium agreed that it did not support 
detailed and sophisticated quantitative analysis. Instead, more limited quantitative analysis was 
used to explore the data and highlight key trends; these were subsequently explored in greater 
detail through examination of case information. Various techniques were employed: in some 
cases, it was necessary to find the right benchmarks for comparison with the broader population; 
for others the most useful findings were uncovered through analysis of subcategories, while 
correlations between variables also produced valuable insights. 
Process Variables: Attack Methodology and Logistics
Box 1: Key Findings.
• Of the seventy-two successfully launched attacks recorded in the database, religiously inspired 
attacks were the most frequent at 38 per cent, but caused only 8 per cent of fatalities; right-
wing terrorist attacks were more lethal, accounting for 24 per cent of launched attacks but 48 
per cent of fatalities
• The most frequent targets were civilians, in particular ethnic and religious minorities, asylum 
seekers and immigrants. A large majority of religious targets were Muslim
• Explosives resulted in only 4 per cent of fatalities, contrasting sharply with firearms which 
accounted for 89 per cent 
• Lone-actor terrorists with military training or experience were, on average, more lethal than 
their untrained counterparts, accounting for 19 per cent of perpetrators but 29 per cent of 
fatalities.
Database Overview
Ninety-eight lone-actor terrorist plots were identified between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 
2014, including seventy-nine led by individuals, twelve by dyads and seven by triads. Among the 
ninety-eight plots identified, seventy-two were successfully launched attacks, including sixty 
perpetrated by individuals acting alone, six by dyads and six by triads (see Table 1 overleaf).
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Table 1: Number of Lone-Actor Terrorism Plots Planned, Attempted or Carried Out in Thirty 
European Countries (EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland) between 1 January 2000 
and 31 December 2014.
Country Total Individual Dyad Triad
1 Great Britain 38 27 8 3
2 France 11 10 1 0
3 Germany 5 4 0 1
4 Sweden 5 3 1 1
5 Spain 4 4 0 0
6 The Netherlands 4 4 0 0
7 Belgium 4 4 0 0
8 Finland 4 3 1 0
9 Norway 4 3 0 1
10 Denmark 3 3 0 0
11 Italy 3 2 0 1
12 Poland 2 2 0 0
13 Slovakia 2 2 0 0
14 Switzerland 2 2 0 0
15 Northern Ireland 1 1 0 0
16 Czech Republic 1 1 0 0
17 Estonia 1 1 0 0
18 Romania 1 1 0 0
19 Bulgaria 1 1 0 0
20 Greece 1 1 0 0
21 Austria 1 0 1 0
22 Hungary 0 0 0 0
23 Slovenia 0 0 0 0
24 Lithuania 0 0 0 0
25 Croatia 0 0 0 0
26 Ireland 0 0 0 0
27 Latvia 0 0 0 0
28 Malta 0 0 0 0
29 Portugal 0 0 0 0
30 Cyprus 0 0 0 0
31 Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Total Plots 98 79 12 7
Total Individuals 
Involved*
124 79 24 21
* The data-set includes analysis of 120 individuals out of the 124 involved, given some technical issues (for 
example, insufficient information) or other sensitivities (for example, age).
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Lone-actor terrorism in Europe is rare. In ten of the thirty countries studied, no lone-actor terrorist 
plot could be identified across fifteen years; only four countries had at least five plots; and only two 
had more than five. 
Analysis suggests an overall increase in lone-actor terrorism across Europe during the past 
fifteen years. 









It is important to note that information on recent plots is more detailed and more readily available 
thanks to the rise in digital archives of news reports; however, even acknowledging this potential 
bias in data collection, the overall trend appears clear. 
Casualties
On average, lone-actor terrorist plots resulted in 1.99 fatalities and 4.58 injuries, with large standard 
deviations of 8.30 and 24.60, respectively; however, these figures are partly skewed by the attacks 
perpetrated by Anders Breivik on 22 July 2011.7 Seventy-seven people were killed and 242 injured 
on that day alone, illustrating the damage a single individual can cause. Therefore, excluding Breivik as 
7. Entries in the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) database are made against perpetrators 
rather than attacks; as a result, the bombings of government buildings in the centre of Oslo and 
the shootings on the island of Utøya by Anders Breivik in 2011 are recorded in a single entry.
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an outlier, lone-actor terrorist plots resulted in an average of 1.22 fatalities and 2.13 injuries, with 
standard deviations of 3.23 and 4.28, respectively. 
Even once Breivik is excluded as an outlier, these standard deviations remain relatively high, 
illustrating the degree of variation across the data-set. Of the lone-actor plots, 76 per cent failed to 
cause any fatalities, while 58 per cent caused no injuries. These findings underline that while lone-
actor terrorist attacks can be devastating, a high proportion of plots fail to manifest in this manner.
Casualty rates were also examined within ideological subgroups: including the attack by Breivik, it 
was found that right-wing attacks caused 260 injuries and ninety-four fatalities,8 while religiously 
inspired attacks killed sixteen and injured sixty-five people.
Table 2: Casualties from Lone-Actor Terrorism Plots.
Ideology Plots Attacks Injured Fatalities
Ethno-National and Separatist 2 2 1 0
Left Wing and Anarchist 3 3 29 8
Religiously Inspired 36 27 65 16
Right Wing 31 17 260 94
Single Issue 5 5 18 19
Other 21 18 76 58
Total 98 72 449 195
These results mirror findings across the West more broadly, where 80 per cent of deaths from 
lone-actor terrorism have been attributed to right-wing extremists, nationalists, anti-government 
elements or other forms of political extremism, rather than religiously inspired terrorism.9
Targets
Civilians are the most common target of plots in the data-set (35 per cent) – in particular, specific 
ethnic and religious minorities, asylum seekers and immigrants. A large majority of religious targets 
were Muslim. The plurality of lone actors who targeted civilians were religiously inspired (37 per 
cent), followed by right-wing perpetrators (25 per cent) and school shooters (20 per cent). 
Weapons
The most frequent types of weapons used by perpetrators were firearms (31 per cent), multiple types 
of weapon (21 per cent), explosives (17 per cent) and bladed weapons (such as a knife, machete 
or axe – 12 per cent). While 92 per cent of bladed-weapons plots and 100 per cent of identified 
firearms plots led to launched attacks, this was the case for less than half of the explosives plots 
8. Right-wing plots resulted in eighteen injuries and seventeen fatalities if Breivik is excluded as an 
outlier.
9. Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2015 (Sydney, New York, NY and Mexico: 
Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).
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(45 per cent). These findings perhaps illustrate the challenges in acquiring and producing explosives 
without detection; plots using only firearms or bladed weapons require less planning and present 
fewer opportunities for law enforcement to intervene.
Moreover, even where explosives plots reach the point of attack, their lethality is low, perhaps due in 
part to the difficulties in successfully producing an effective explosive. The lethality of explosives was 
found to be 0.57 fatalities per attack, in contrast to 6.65 for firearms attacks.10 Across the database, 
explosives account for only 4 per cent of fatalities, in stark contrast to the 89 per cent caused by 
firearms. Interestingly, bladed weapons also had a low lethality at 0.36, accounting for only 2 per 
cent of deaths, illustrating that although such lone-actor terrorist attacks may be difficult to detect 
and disrupt, they do not often result in mass casualties.
An analysis of weapons used across ideologies found that there were no substantial differences; 
however, there were clear differences between countries. While lone-actor terrorist plots in 
Great Britain led to two fatalities and seventeen injuries, none of these were caused by firearms. 
In contrast, four attacks using firearms in France caused nineteen fatalities and thirty-two injured, 
accounting for 95 per cent of fatalities and 53 per cent of injuries in that country. In Germany, all 
five lone-actor terrorist attacks were carried out with firearms. It is interesting to note that firearms 
attacks were more prominent in countries with higher rates of legal gun ownership; the UK (Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland) has only 6.5 legally held firearms per 100,000 inhabitants, compared 
with approximately thirty per 100,000 in France and Germany.11 
Overall, these findings suggest that lone-actor terrorist attacks using firearms are more likely to 
occur in countries with higher rates of legal gun ownership and cause more fatalities than attacks 
using explosives or bladed weapons. Interestingly, across the data-set, 38 per cent of the firearms 
used in attacks were legally owned. 
Military Training
The CLAT literature review highlighted findings from previous research that the level of military 
experience among lone-actor terrorists is higher than might be expected within the general 
population.12 It is further hypothesised that individuals with military training or combat experience 
may be more ‘effective’ in conducting their attack, causing greater numbers of fatalities, a theory 
supported by studies of terrorism more broadly.13 Within the CLAT database, the lethality of 
perpetrators with military training was 2.29 fatalities per individual, markedly higher than their 
10. To be as comprehensive as possible, in calculating lethality rates the fatalities from ‘multiple-
weapon’ attacks have been included where it is possible to definitively attribute casualties. 
11. European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Firearms and the Internal Security of the EU: Protecting Citizens and Disrupting Illegal 
Trafficking’, COM(2013) 716, 21 October 2013. 
12. Pantucci, Ellis and Chaplais, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review’.
13. See Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘When Jihadis Come Marching Home’, Perspectives, RAND Corporation, 
2014;  Brian A Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction: Volume 1: Organizational Learning 
in Terrorist Groups and its Implications for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2005); Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in 
10 Lone-Actor Terrorism
counterparts without such experience at 1.47; if Breivik is removed as an outlier, the lethality of non-
military perpetrators drops further to just 0.68.
This raises an important issue: the most lethal lone-actor terrorist in the database, Breivik, had 
no military training; the absence of such experience cannot therefore be considered a conclusive 
indicator that a perpetrator is less dangerous. Therefore, while these findings do offer some support 
for the hypothesis that, on average, military training or experience increases the lethality of lone-
actor terrorists, they also suggest that other factors must be taken into account. 
It was also found that attacks planned by those with military training or experience were prevented 
in only 18 per cent of cases, a substantially lower proportion than the 36 per cent of perpetrators 
who had no comparable training or experience. While it is not possible to establish causality, one 
plausible interpretation could be that such experience may also have increased their ability to avoid 
detection during the planning and development stages. 
Without further research on the role of military training it is not possible to draw firm conclusions 
and the data certainly do not show a correlation with a propensity to commit acts of lone-actor 
terrorism. These findings do suggest that it may be a useful factor to consider in assessing the level 
of risk posed by a potential lone-actor terrosist. However, as the case of Breivik illustrates, only 
alongside other factors.
Process Variables: Political Engagement and Online Activity
Box 2: Key Findings.
• Religiously inspired and right-wing perpetrators account for three out of four lone-actor 
terrorists in Europe over the past fifteen years (religiously inspired 38 per cent; right wing 33 
per cent) 
• The majority of lone-actor terrorists communicate their motivations orally or through internet 
postings; very few write detailed manifestos (only 13 per cent)
• The majority of lone-actor terrorists (58 per cent) did not exhibit signs of political engagement. 
However, of those that did, right-wing lone actors were more likely to be active in political 
movements than those motivated by religion
• Approximately two-thirds of lone actors had never been active within an extremist group; 
however, where links were found, 65 per cent were with groups known to advocate or at least 
condone violence
• For lone actors who were active online, mainstream social media was the most popular 
medium for communication. More broadly, the Internet was used for downloading training 
material and conducting basic reconnaissance.
Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting’, American Political Science 
Review (Vol. 107, No. 1, February 2013). 
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Ideology
The suspected ideology of the perpetrators was determined through either media reportage 
or information that emerged during legal proceedings. As illustrated by Table 3, 86 out of the 
120 perpetrators in the database were either religiously inspired (38 per cent) or right-wing 
extremists (33 per cent), accounting for approximately three out of four lone-actor terrorists 
during this time period. Given the intense public focus on religiously inspired terrorism, the 
finding that right-wing extremists account for a similar proportion of perpetrators within the 
database is particularly significant. Moreover, the number of far-right attacks is likely to be even 
higher due to under-reporting by the media (see Limitations section above).






Left Wing and Anarchism 3
Ethno-Nationalist and Separatist 2
Justifications and Manifestos
In 73 per cent of cases, perpetrators had offered oral or written justification for their actions;14 
however, the format of these expressions differed substantially. Only sixteen perpetrators (13 per 
cent) wrote and published a detailed manifesto, either online or as a physical copy. While such 
documents can offer detailed insights into the perpetrator’s radicalisation, the development 
of  attack plans and preparation techniques, they are comparatively rare. The publication of 
a manifesto is therefore likely to offer opportunities for intervention in only a limited number 
of lone-actor plots. In other cases, perpetrators either harnessed the immediacy and reach of 
social media to publish media files or text documents just a few hours prior to their attacks, or 
alternatively made significant oral statements just before the attack or during arrest.
Motivations
Unsurprisingly, the motivations expressed range drastically across the ideologies represented 
in the data-set. Perpetrators appeared to harbour broad disgruntlements with populations, 
governments or social movements, or anger over specific events (either personal or political) 
for which they were seeking retribution. 
14. In the 28 per cent of cases where such explicit justification was not present, motivations were 
often brought to light during trials with the discovery of evidence or material possessions – hence 
these cases still warranted inclusion in the data-set.
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Among the right-wing perpetrators in the data-set, there is a strong emphasis on immigration 
policy, a wish to inspire patriotism and to defend their country from what they term ‘Islamisation’. 
This reflects a shift within broader right-wing extremism, with many groups and individuals – 
including Breivik – denouncing Nazism, fascism and anti-Semitism, and instead defining their 
cause as defence against a perceived threat from Islam.15 However, there remains a significant 
portion of lone-actor terrorists in the database who appear to have been preoccupied solely 
with neo-Nazi symbolism and the idolisation of far-right figureheads. Examining the influence of 
specific events, in Great Britain there are indications that following the murder of Lee Rigby, 47 
per cent of right-wing perpetrators were in part motivated by that attack. These cases include 
arson attacks and the bombing of Islamic centres. 
Within the religiously inspired cohort, there are numerous references to taking revenge for 
political action, such as Western Europe’s foreign policy in the Middle East in the aftermath of 
9/11, the national government’s support for Israel, the treatment of terror suspects imprisoned in 
Abu Ghraib or retribution for cartoons that depicted the Prophet Muhammad. These references 
are complemented by attempts to justify their intentions or actions by citing religious extremist 
principles like the waging of violent jihad. 
Political Engagement
The majority of lone-actor terrorists in the data-set (58 per cent) did not appear to be politically 
active.16 Of those that were politically engaged, 43 per cent had attended meetings and rallies, 
while 47 per cent had conducted their relationship with the group solely through material or 
literature. However, it should be noted that this latter form of engagement is likely to have 
grown over recent years in positive correlation with the rise of social media and the availability 
of extremist material in downloadable multimedia format. Indeed, 50 per cent of perpetrators 
conducted at least part of their engagement in a virtual setting. Some of these cases involve the 
downloading of videos, images and literature as well as interaction on official forums and pages. 
Within ideological categories, right-wing lone-actor terrorists were more likely to be politically 
active (62.5 per cent) than their religiously inspired counterparts (44.3 per cent).
Links to Extreme Groups
Approximately two-thirds of the perpetrators (67 per cent) had never been active in an 
extremist group. Where connections had been established, 65 per cent of links (or 22 per cent 
of the overall database) were with extremist groups known to advocate or at least condone 
violence in the name of their cause. These would typically be groups that are known to have a 
15. Toby Archer, ‘Breivik’s Mindset: The Counterjihad and the New Transatlantic Anti-Muslim Right’, 
in Max Taylor, P M Currie and Donald Holbrook (eds), Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and 
Terrorism (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 169–86.
16. The variable of political engagement takes into account the perpetrator’s involvement in, or 
membership of, both mainstream political parties and informal political movements. This can also 
include extremist groups. 
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history of involvement in violent attacks, and which are deemed politically illegitimate by the 
state in which they operate. Moreover, 69 per cent of these links to violent groups (or 15 per 
cent of the overall database) were current at the time of the attack. While the overall level 
of engagement with extremist groups is low, these findings suggest there is perhaps a need 
for greater surveillance of groups which advocate violence and those who interact with them. 
Although religiously inspired lone actors were more likely to have a link to an extremist group, 
the range of organisations linked to right-wing perpetrators was greater.
Digital Footprint
Within the database, examples of online activity included using the Internet to form relationships 
with others, to gain the inspiration for the attack or to acquire technical knowledge. The roles 
of the internet and social media have been particularly prominent in discourse around lone-
actor terrorism in recent years.17 Chronological analysis of the CLAT database shows a steady 
increase in the use of mainstream social media platforms in plots from around 2004 onwards, 
as platforms became established, grew in popularity and diversified in capabilities.
Prior to the popularisation of mainstream social media, password-protected forums and themed 
blogs were the most prevalent form of communication for the perpetrators. Many of the small 
cells (dyads or triads) met on such platforms, some consequently creating their own space to 
discuss and solidify their attack plans. 
Where perpetrators have primarily engaged through social media platforms, the information 
gathered overwhelmingly indicates a one-way relationship – reading and sharing relevant 
news, and expressing opinions, rather than utilising these platforms to form connections 
with other people.
The Internet was used for tactical research in just under a third of all cases (33 per cent), in the 
form of downloading manuals, watching training videos, or undertaking basic reconnaissance 
such as researching the floorplan of a building, finding addresses or searching lists of individuals 
in order to identify targets. Table 4 shows the distribution of these activities across the data-set, 
with twenty-one out of the thirty-nine perpetrators who used the Internet to aid their attack 
downloading training manuals (54 per cent). These manuals, which included The Anarchist’s 
Cookbook (referenced in six cases), The Jolly Roger Cookbook and The Complete Improvised 
Kitchen, provide instructions for the construction and detonation of explosives. Of these twenty-
one cases, only ten successfully launched attacks using explosives; the remainder were either 
thwarted by the authorities, or ultimately used an alternative weapon. Of these ten bombings, 
only one directly caused fatalities – Anders Breivik’s. This finding underlines questions over the 
accuracy and effectiveness of training manuals.
17. See Anne Aly, ‘The Terrorists’ Audience: A Model of Internet Radicalisation’, Journal of Australian 
Professional Intelligence Officers (Vol. 171, 2009), pp. 3–19; Ines von Behr et al., ‘Radicalisation 
in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism’, RAND 
Corporation, 2013.
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Table 4: Online Sources for Tactical Knowledge.
Source Percentage
Downloaded Training Manual 54
Watched Training Video 5
Other 31
Multiple 10
The proportion of perpetrators who watched training videos appears relatively small; however, 
this is likely to become more significant over time given the centrality of videos to propaganda 
strategy for many extremist organisations.
Personal Variables: Personal Characteristics 
Box 3: Key Findings.
• Religiously inspired and right-wing ideologies present very different age profiles: the majority 
of religiously inspired perpetrators were younger than twenty-five years old, with the number 
of perpetrators declining as age increased; this is in direct contrast to right-wing lone-actor 
terrorists where the majority were at least forty years old 
• The findings indicate a possible link between social isolation and mental-health disorders. This 
was particularly pronounced in the case of school shooters 
• Religiously inspired perpetrators were seldom socially isolated 
• Where legally owned firearms were the weapon chosen for attack, there was an indication of 
mental-health disorder in 53 per cent of perpetrators. 
Age and Ideological Profiles
The average age of the 120 perpetrators was found to be 29.7 years old at the time of attack or 
arrest, with the youngest perpetrator being fifteen and the oldest seventy-four. The standard 
deviation was 9.9, indicating a large variance between the different perpetrators. Age was also 
contrasted with ideology, the results of which are shown in Table 5.
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* For the ideology listed as ‘other’, only school shooters were examined here. The results in relation to 
both left-wing anarchist and ethno-nationalist and separatists are omitted due to the low numbers of 
perpetrators: 3 and 2 respectively.
Not surprisingly, school shooters were found to be younger than the overall average in the 
database. It is also notable that religiously inspired perpetrators are on average almost five years 
younger than those driven by a right-wing ideology. Moreover, there is less variation among this 
group, with a standard deviation of 7.69 in contrast to 11.88 for right-wing extremists. 
These disparities were investigated further. Religiously inspired and right-wing perpetrators 
comprise more than 70 per cent of cases in the database; however, despite a comparable 
number of cases at forty-six and forty, respectively, these ideologies present very different age 
profiles. Among the youngest group aged less than twenty-five years old, it was found that 
almost half of the perpetrators were religiously inspired (47 per cent); in contrast, among the 
perpetrators aged forty years or older, only 21 per cent were religiously inspired and 47 per cent 
were right-wing extremists.  
Table 6: Age Profiles of Selected Ideological Categories.
Age Groups <25 25–39 40+ Total No. of 
Perpetrators
Religiously Inspired 47% 38% 21% 46
Right Wing 24% 36% 47% 40
Other 29% 13% 16% 23
Single Issue 0% 1% 10% 6
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Variations between age groups were also evident in relation to social isolation and mental-health 
disorders. The youngest group (younger than twenty-five years old) showed the highest percentage of 
social isolation at 36 per cent; fewer perpetrators aged 25–39 years old exhibited similar signs (25 per 
cent); while those aged at least forty years old presented the lowest figure at 11 per cent. Similarly, 
it is the youngest age group (younger than twenty-five years old) where the highest percentage of 
suggested mental-health disorder is found (40 per cent). 
Similarly, ideological categories presented strikingly different results in relation to social isolation. Across 
the database 29 per cent of perpetrators were in some way socially isolated; this rose slightly to 33 per 
cent for right-wing extremists, but dropped drastically to only 9 per cent for religiously inspired lone-
actor terrorists. As outlined above, the highest figure was in relation to school shooters at 75 per cent.
The prevalence of ‘noteworthy life events’ also varied substantially between different ideological 
groups.18  While such events were noted in 43 per cent of cases across the data-set, the figure was 
higher within the single-issue subset at 67 per cent, and among the school shooters at 88 per cent. 
Upon examining the latter group, it was established that in many cases the event related to bullying. 
In contrast to these elevated figures, only 37 per cent of religiously inspired perpetrators and 28 per 
cent of right-wing cases suggested the prior occurrence of a noteworthy life event. These findings 
suggest that a noteworthy life event should not be considered a consistent trigger leading to a process 
of radicalisation and mobilisation towards violence.  
18. A ‘noteworthy life event’ is defined as an event so significant – either positive or negative – that it 
was cited as altering the life of the perpetrator: for example, the loss of parents at a young age.
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Mental-Health Disorders
In 35 per cent of cases there was an indication of a mental-health disorder within news reporting; 
however, in order to interpret the significance of this result it is crucial to have a benchmark. In examining 
the EU, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, the World Health Organization (WHO) found that ‘27 per cent 
of the adult population (18–65) had experienced at least one of a series of mental disorders in the past 
year (this included problems arising from substance abuse, psychoses, depression, anxiety and eating 
disorders).’19 Although the WHO uses a broad definition, this offers an appropriate comparator given 
the low threshold used by the corresponding CLAT variable that records any ‘indication of’ mental 
disorder. The finding of a potential mental-health disorder in 35 per cent of lone-actor terrorists 
therefore does not suggest a substantial deviation from the broader population. Moreover, the WHO 
also states that ‘[about] two-thirds of people suffering mental disorders will never seek help because of 
discrimination and the stigma attached to such conditions’, suggesting the population figure may also 
be higher than indicated.20  
Table 7: Indications of Mental-Health Disorders among Lone-Actor Terrorists.
Religiously 
Inspired




Indication of a 
Mental-Health 
Disorder
24% 28% 33% 63%
Indications of mental-health disorders were also examined within ideological subgroups. The most 
striking finding is with regard to school shooters, where there was an indication of mental-health 
disorder in 63 per cent of cases. Interestingly, this figure was lowest among religiously inspired lone-
actor terrorists at 24 per cent. Some caution may be required in interpreting these findings. Reporting 
bias may influence whether journalists investigate the possibility of mental-health disorders; for 
example, questions regarding psychological state are perhaps more prominent in the case of school 
shooters. Some communities are also reluctant to speak with journalists, and some cultures unwilling 
to openly discuss mental-health issues. Nevertheless, the finding that 63 per cent of school shooters 
exhibited some form of mental-health disorder has clear implications for policy-makers.
In cases where there was an indication of a mental-health disorder, 50 per cent of perpetrators were 
also socially isolated, in contrast to only 17 per cent where there were no suggestions of mental-
health problems. Similarly, examination of socially isolated perpetrators found that in 62 per cent of 
cases there was an indication of mental-health disorder. These findings suggest a link between these 
two variables. 
Finally, where legally owned firearms were the chosen weapon for attack (fifteen cases), there was an 
indication of mental-health disorder for 53 per cent of perpetrators.
19. World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, ‘Data and Statistics’, 2016, <http://www.
euro.who.int/en/health-topics/noncommunicable-diseases/mental-health/data-and-statistics>, 
accessed 22 February 2016. 
20. Ibid.
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Process Variables: Leakage and Interactions with Authorities
Box 4: Key Findings.
• Of lone-actor terrorists recorded in the database, 34 per cent exhibited a change in behaviour. 
These changes were more prevalent within the religiously inspired category where 50 per cent 
of perpetrators exhibited this potential indicator, in contrast to only 15 per cent of right-wing 
terrorist plotters
• Of perpetrators, 46 per cent exhibited ‘leakage’ – giving an indication of either their extreme 
views, intention to act or even some attack details in advance
• Of the religiously inspired perpetrators that exhibited leakage, 45 per cent ‘leaked’ to friends 
or family, in contrast to only 18 per cent of leakage by right-wing perpetrators. Right-wing lone-
actor terrorists were more likely to post telling indicators online, where 41 per cent of their 
leakage occurred
• Excluding cases where a perpetrator was identified during (or immediately following) an 
incident, 40 per cent of right-wing extremists were uncovered by an element of chance – for 
example, as part of an investigation into other offences or because the perpetrator accidentally 
detonated a device.
Changes in Behaviour
Changes in behaviour can be crucial indicators that an individual is becoming more extreme in his 
or her views or even considering violent acts. The CLAT database was therefore designed to capture 
this information. Variables record whether public information indicates a change in the perpetrator’s 
behaviour in the period leading up to the attack (or planned attack), along with any available details 
regarding both the nature of the behaviour and the context in which it was noted. 
Overall, 34 per cent of lone-actor terrorists exhibited a change in behaviour. Moreover, these changes 
were more prevalent among religiously inspired lone-actor terrorists; 50 per cent of perpetrators 
in this category exhibited this potential indicator in contrast to only 15 per cent of right-wing 
terrorist plotters. Examples of such behaviour include becoming increasingly distant from family 
members, and adopting sudden and drastic changes in attitude, as well as more specific ones like 
changing social groups.
Leakage
The term ‘leakage’ is used to denote situations where the perpetrator has given any indication of 
extreme views or an intention to act to a third party; it may be intentional or done unwittingly. 
Leakage may be limited to behavioural changes but can also be much broader, in some extreme 
cases including outright declarations of an intention to commit a terrorist act.
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Variables captured whether leakage occurred, its nature and the audience. Overall, 46 per cent of 
perpetrators exhibited leakage; this was consistent across religiously inspired and right-wing actors, 
with no significant variation. This leakage took various forms: in 35 per cent of cases it gave an 
indication of the perpetrator’s extremist ideology, but nothing further; for example, expressing 
extreme views to friends and family, or being seen to access extremist websites. 
In 44 per cent of cases the perpetrator went further and ‘leaked’ some indication of an intention to 
act. In some examples this was deliberate, posting online that he or she planned to become a martyr, 
telling colleagues or sending information to the media. In other cases this was done unwittingly; 
those around one perpetrator realised he was experimenting with explosives when he was seen with 
suspicious injuries, while another failed to dispose of receipts for chemicals which were subsequently 
found by family members.
In 21 per cent of cases the perpetrator shared at least some details of the planned attack; one 
example told his ex-girlfriend and showed her the weapons in his bag, another told his parents, 
while a third example leaked attack details to a third party whom the individual was trying to recruit.
There were striking differences between ideological groups with regard to the audience of the 
leakage. Religiously inspired lone-actor terrorists were most likely to leak information to friends or 
family (45 per cent), expressing extreme views to those in their immediate vicinity; in contrast, only 
18 per cent of leakage by right-wing extremists was to this audience.
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Right-wing lone-actor terrorists were more likely to post telling indicators online, where 41 
per cent of their leakage occurred. Examples include a perpetrator who left a message on the 
internet forum of a known far-right group, Combat 18: ‘Watch TV on Sunday, I will be the star. 
Death to ZOG! 88!’21 Another example had joined a number of far-right groups on Facebook 
including Bloc Identitaire (formerly Unité Radicale), Maison Commune and Belle et Rebelle.
The research team had posited that younger perpetrators might be more careless in revealing 
their extremist beliefs or attack plans; however, analysis suggested no correlation between age 
and leakage. Similarly, there was no correlation with mental-health issues: where there was an 
indication of mental-health issues those perpetrators were no more likely to exhibit leakage.
The timeframe in which leakage occurred was also investigated, in order to ascertain any patterns 
and to determine whether leakage allowed sufficient time for detection and intervention; 
however, this information was either unavailable or unclear in too many cases. Nevertheless, 
the database provides useful insights into the prevalence of leakage, its nature and crucially the 
audiences that are most likely to encounter it.
21. ZOG is an abbreviation for Zionist Occupation Government, while 88 is used to represent ‘Heil 
Hitler’, as ‘H’ is the eighth letter of the alphabet.
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Interaction with Authorities
Variables were designed to capture whether the perpetrator had been known previously to public 
authorities such as mental-health practitioners, social-welfare services or law-enforcement 
bodies. Separate variables also recorded whether the engagement (or investigation) was current 
at the time of the attack or intervention. 
Convictions offer clear evidence of interaction with law enforcement; moreover, the project’s 
literature review highlighted findings from previous studies that there is an elevated rate of 
previous convictions among lone-actor terrorists.22 These findings are reinforced by the CLAT 
database, where there is evidence to suggest 33 per cent of perpetrators had a previous criminal 
sanction; among right-wing extremists this figure rises to 40 per cent. These figures are notably 
higher than for the general population; in the UK it is estimated that 20 per cent of adults have 
a criminal conviction.23 Although certainly an interesting finding, without examining the nature 
of any previous convictions and whether they overlap with – or far predate – the perpetrator’s 
terrorist activity, it is not possible to determine whether they indicate an opportunity to 
identify and disrupt plots. Unfortunately,  more detailed information regarding interaction with 
authorities was often unavailable or inconclusive. 
These data limitations also precluded extensive quantitative analysis across the database; 
however, some trends were still apparent. Overall, 75 per cent of religiously inspired plots led 
to an attack, in contrast to 55 per cent of right-wing plots. This disparity could indicate that 
religiously inspired perpetrators are perhaps more effective than their right-wing counterparts, 
or that law enforcement are more successful in identifying right-wing extremists; however, 
further examination appears to preclude the latter. Excluding cases where a perpetrator was 
identified during (or immediately following) an incident, it was established that 40 per cent of 
right-wing extremists were uncovered by an element of chance, as part of an investigation into 
other offences or because the perpetrator accidentally detonated a device, drawing attention 
to his or her activities. 
One perpetrator sustained serious injuries while testing a device and was airlifted to hospital; 
the nature of his injuries roused suspicions and a search of his home revealed further explosive 
devices. The bomb-making activities of another perpetrator were discovered when his home 
was searched as part of an investigation into the possession of indecent images of children, 
while in a third example a perpetrator’s terrorist activity was uncovered following his arrest for 
public-order offences after urinating on a train platform. These examples stand in stark contrast 
to religiously inspired cases. Although chance was also evident in some examples, with one 
perpetrator being identified following a routine traffic stop and another having accidentally 
detonated a device, overall 88 per cent of interventions were intelligence-led.24 This disparity 
22. Pantucci, Ellis and Chaplais, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review’.
23. Stephen Howard, ‘“Ban the Box” Campaign Asks Employers to Give Ex-Offenders a Chance’, 
Guardian, 17 October 2013. 
24. Excluding cases where a perpetrator was identified during (or immediately following) an incident.
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suggests that intelligence machinery may be more finely attuned to detecting religiously inspired 
lone-actor terrorists by comparison to their right-wing counterparts.
Conclusion
Analysis of the CLAT database reaffirms a key assertion from the literature review: there is no 
consistent profile for a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across 
Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most 
likely to manifest, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the period leading up to the 
attack. The policy implications of these findings will be explored in detail within dedicated 
papers in the CLAT series:
• ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper One: Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists’
• ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper Two: Attack Methodology and Logistics’
• ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper Three: Motivations, Political Engagement and 
Online Activity’
• ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper Four: “Leakage” and Interaction with Authorities’.
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